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Updated 17th May 2004

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January 2003 Floods
and Jubilee River
Bank Collapse

Since January 2003 there has been increasing concern about the condition of the Jubilee River and its operation before and during the flooding. A number of residents downstream have actively campaigned for the truth to be published about the Jubilee River at that time and its overall effectiveness. This article illustrates some areas of erosion that occurred when the flood relief channel was first used. Letters highlighting residents concerns since the floods are included here in the Windsor Forum. You are welcome to contribute too.

Background

Over the New Year of 2003 and possibly as early as Christmas 2002 signs of erosion were appearing along the banks of the Jubilee River, before it was used in earnest during the floods that occurred in the first week of January 2003. The picture below shows significant erosion at a bend in the bank, with white water flowing towards it. Had the bank failed at this point water would have flowed through to fields to the right towards Eton Wick.

Erosion January 2003

The picture above was taken on January 2nd 2003 (16.39) and clearly shows a high rate of water flow adjacent to the weir and the damaged bank beyond. Environment Agency workmen had already erected a temporary orange warning barrier where the fence and river bank had slipped into the water.

Bank erosion 2 Jubilee River

The next day contractors had arrived to shore up the bank

Bank erosion Jubilee River

Bank erosion being temporarily repaired at Manor Farm Weir.
(With thanks to P. Bragg for the pictures above)

Phil Bragg writes:

It started before Christmas. The path was initially left open with some orange mesh guiding pedestrians and cyclists to one side, over the Christmas period, but by Jan 2nd the path was closed with metal barriers. Soon after this, stabilisation work commenced with large sand bags and rocks to build up the "dry" side of the bank.
  A few days later I took a few pictures and spoke to a senior chap from the Environment Agency. He said it was a major engineering project and that the path would not be reopening until permanent repairs were done in the Spring. He apologised for the lack of a cycle path. This was about the 4th January.

 There was just one small crane dropping the large bags of sandbags and rocks down to some people who were positioning them. The next day there were many more cranes and two dump trucks, with lorries delivering more materials.
 
At one point it seemed that they had opened a footpath on the opposite side of the river but this was closed when the bank eroded in a similar fashion.
  
By January 24th the temporary repairs seemed to be complete, but the path was still closed, along with a good portion of the hilly part of the landscaping. Access was still possible from Dorney Common.
  
The pictures are not good as the light was poor and I was a long way off, using full zoom!"

A phone call to the Environment Agency at the time confirmed the above. Local rumours about an imminent bank collapse and that the flow to the Jubilee River was deliberately restricted to lessen the erosion, were denied by the EA spokesman, however subsequent reports that we have seen confirm that the diverted flow to the Jubilee River was deliberately restricted to 144 cumecs (cubic metres per second) whereas, in the conditions that existed at the time, a flow rate of 200 cumecs would have been expected. The Jubilee River's capacity is claimed to be 215 cumecs. It has been alleged that some housing in Eton Wick would have been threatened in the event of a bank collapse.

Mill Lane July 2003

Bank erosion at the start of the Jubilee River at Mill Lane is still evident in July 2003

Marsh Lane July 2003

Bank erosion downstream at Mill Lane, photographed in July 2003. North bank.

Bank Erosion at Mill Lane

Bank erosion downstream at Mill Lane, photographed in July 2003. South bank.

In late 2003, repairs were being made along the banks of the Jubilee River with some path closures. In October 2003 work was still in hand at Mill Lane strengthening the banks illustrated above.

It remains to be explained why so much damage was done to the banks of the Flood Relief Channel almost from the outset.

Update May 2004

On May 18th 2004, a Press Release was issued on behalf of the local community groups downstream of The Jubilee River. The Press Release is reproduced here in full.

Jubilee River Exacerbated Flooding
and was known to be flawed before the 2003 Flood Event

  • ENVIRONMENT AGENCY KNEW ABOUT SERIOUS EROSION PROBLEMS WITH JUBILEE RIVER BEFORE 2003 FLOOD EVENT BUT OMITTED TO DISCLOSE THIS UNTIL 16 MONTHS LATER - WHEN FORCED TO DO SO

  • JUBILEE RIVER GATES NOT OPERATED FOR NEARLY 3 DAYS AT HEIGHT OF FLOOD EVENT DUE TO SEVERE EROSION
  • WHEN GATES WERE OPERATED ON 4TH JANUARY, JUST BEFORE MAIDENHEAD WOULD HAVE FLOODED, LARGE SUDDEN RELEASES WERE MADE WHICH EXACERBATED FLOODING DOWNSTREAM
  • The Environment Agency operates the Jubilee River based on water flow and level target indicators set out within the operating procedures. Two of these indicators are tailwater levels at Boulters Lock and a cumecs flow at Windsor Gauging Station (at Datchet).
  • Both of these target indicators had been exceeded by the 1st January 2003, but following an opening on the 1st January of the Taplow Sluice Gates the Jubilee River was not operated for a further three days until the tailwater level at Boulters Lock had exceeded the target level by some 2ft 4ins (0.71m) and the flow at Windsor had reached 320 cumecs which is 140 cumecs above the target flow. Only then - on 4th January 2003 - were the Taplow Sluice Gates operated again.
  • At the FRAG Open Day held at Spelthorne on 27th April 2004 the Environment Agency, under pressure, admitted the reason for not complying with the operational procedures and the ministerial directive was due to structural problems within the Jubilee River and which the Environment Agency had known about as early as November 2002. This crucial information had been withheld by the Environment Agency from the public since the flood event.
  • It is understood further problems occurred at the end of December 2002 and more serious problems on 1st January when the Jubilee River was operated. These problems resulted in the Jubilee River not being operated between the 1st and 4th January, well ahead of the flood peak. Had this been done the extra flow could have been passed on downstream before the main flood event.
  • No reference to this factor is made within the Mechanisms of Flooding report. Mr Onions' report does confirm incorrect operation of the Jubilee River by the Environment Agency but no mention is made to structural problems of the Jubilee River prior to the flood event. This is also missing from Mr Onions' Executive Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations.
  • On the afternoon and evening of Saturday, 4th January large, sudden water releases were made into the Jubilee River. This was not in accordance with the operational procedures. These releases commenced after levels had exceeded 13ft 4ins, an old indicator that Maidenhead was about to flood. It would therefore appear the Environment Agency decided to operate the Jubilee River to validate £110million spent on the scheme, knowing that the system was incomplete, not commissioned, had structural defects, staff were untrained, operating procedures untested and already invalidated by delay. These large, sudden releases resulted in:
    • Further serious damage within the Jubilee River watercourse which
      was already known to be flawed before the 4th January operation.
    • Unnecessary flooding to communities from Windsor riverside and downstream because water into the Jubilee River was released too close to the peak of the flood. The flooding was also exacerbated by loss of the floodplain at Maidenhead, Dorney and Eton Wick and by the cessation of dredging since 1993 which reduced the river capacity over time. (This is stated in the Mechanisms of Flooding Report, Volume 1, 11.3.25)
    • Communities, lives and properties were put at risk by using the Jubilee River watercourse which was structurally flawed. (This has since been confirmed by the extent of redesign recommended by the independent consultants, W S Atkins.)

THE CONCLUSION DRAWN FROM THE PRECEDING FACTS AND PUBLISHED DATA CAN ONLY BE THAT MISMANAGEMENT AND MISOPERATION OF THE RIVER BY THE ENVIRONMENT AGENCY PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE SEVERITY OF THE FLOODING DOWNSTREAM OF THE JUBILEE RIVER

17th May 2004


Repairs required between The Myrke and Pococks Lane Bridge
Reported in June 2004

The Myrke to Pococks Lane Bridge

The stretch of the Jubillee River which is causing concern to downstream residents. Apparently seepage was noticed through the banks at this point which could have been a pointer towards a possible breach in severe flood condition.

The Myrke to Pococks Lane Bridge - The ditch behind the embankment

Behind the bank is a ditch which from a layman's point of view could cause weakness in the banks themselves

See The Jubilee River Discussion Forum for more information

Related Topics

Flood Relief Scheme - Index

River Thames - Index of Stories

Royal Windsor Home Page



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